



Improving retirement finances

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Yale SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT



Increase savings
Choukhmane



**Increase access to
home equity**
Bateman, Fang,
Hanewald, and
Wu



**Create a better
investment**
Merton and
Muralidhar

Outline



Is there a problem?



Do defaults help?



Will SeLFIES be attractive?



How big is the demand for reverse mortgages in China?


Outline



Is there a problem?


Many Americans arrive at retirement with no liquid wealth

Net worth excluding pensions, student loans, durables, homes, and collateralized debts, ages 61-70




Adding defined contribution pensions doesn't really affect the left tail

Net worth excluding defined benefit pensions, durables, homes, and collateralized debts, ages 61-70



The left tail accumulates wealth mainly through illiquid home equity

Net worth excluding defined benefit pensions,
ages 61-70



Two takeaways

- SeLFIES cannot help the left tail without a radical change in their savings rates or homeownership status
 - Can savings defaults change this?
- Home equity is the main asset in the left tail
 - Can reverse mortgages make this asset more useful?

Maybe there's nothing to worry about... in 1992

Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006)

- Data: 1992 Health and Retirement Study
 - 1931-41 birth cohort + spouses
 - 12,652 persons in 7,702 households

- Solve lifecycle savings problem for each household

Optimal vs. actual wealth




FIG. 2.—Scatter plot of optimal and actual wealth. Observed net wealth is constructed from the 1992 HRS. Optimal net worth comes from solving the baseline model described in the text.

WSJ | OPINION

OPINION | COMMENTARY

The Phony Retirement Crisis

By Andrew Biggs

Feb. 28, 2019 6:56 pm ET

Biggs: Why there is no crisis


- 8 in 10 retirees say they have enough money to “live comfortably”
- Over-65 poverty rate: 9.7% in 1990, 6.7% in 2012
- Median retiree real income rose 56% from 1989 to 2016
- DB pension participation peaked at 39% of employees in 1973
- Today, 61% of employees participate in pension plan

It used
to be
worse

Economic optimality

- Determined not just by *level* of consumption
- Determined by whether can maintain standard of living across time

Running out of money late in life?



Do households maintain standard of living across retirement transition?

Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001)

- Data: PSID, 1978-1990
- Consumption measure: Expenditures on
 - Food
 - Imputed or actual rental value of one's residence
- Finding: Big drops in consumption upon retirement

Expenditure is not consumption

Aguiar and Hurst (2005)

- Food expenditure drops but **not** food consumption (or quality) on average upon retirement
 - Home production increases in retirement
- **BUT** among retirees with < \$1,000 in liquid assets and no home ownership (bottom wealth decile), 19% decline in calories consumed

Hurst (2008)


- “Lifecycle model has a hard time matching the magnitudes of the decline in expenditures for households in the bottom **quartile** of the wealth distribution”

Aguiar and Hurst datasets are outliers

Stephens and Toohey (2018)

- Aguiar and Hurst (2005) use 1989-91 and 1994-96 Continuing Survey of Food Intake of Individuals (CSFII)
- 1989-91 CSFII had methodological problems
 - Expert panel convened by USDA “does not recommend use of the data from the 1987-88 NFCS”
 - 1989-91 CSFII used same methodology

Average impact of retirement on caloric intake



~20% reduction in calories excluding problematic datasets

Effect of retirement on BMI

Chung, Domino, and Stearns (2009)

– Data: Health and Retirement Study, 1992-2002

– Finding: Retirement increases BMI by 0.24 units

- 1.45 pound gain for 5' 7" person
- Average BMI gain from age 50-60 is 1.30

Outline




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Do defaults help?

Effect of 3% default on cumulative contributions to pay




Effect of 3% autoenrollment

Figure 7: The effect of auto-enrollment on total wealth at age 65



Retirement plan availability, private-sector workers, 2012


**59% of nonagricultural wage and salary workers have
“salary reduction plan”**




Dushi, Iams, and Lichtenstein, 2015. “Retirement plan coverage by firm size: An update.” *Social Security Bulletin*.

Copeland, 2013. “Retirement plan participation: Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data, 2012.” *EBRI Notes*.

UK participation rates under autoenrollment



OregonSaves participation rate



The case for more mandatory saving

Beshears, Choi, Clayton, Harris, Laibson, and Madrian (2019)

- Optimal system: Forced savings in completely illiquid account that allows for almost complete smoothing of consumption between working life and retirement
- Welfare loss from lack of flexibility to rational households \ll Welfare gain to households with low self-control

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
Will SeLFIES be attractive?

SeLFIES trajectory

- Level real cash payment per period for fixed length in retirement
- Decreasing value as retirement progresses
- “...provides a precise match to cash flow needs of retirees”

Retiree wealth trajectory


Wave-to-Wave Changes in Median Net Financial Assets by Family Status, Original HRS Cohort (age 51–61 in 1992)



Retiree behavior

- Wealth is preserved until trigger event (e.g. death of spouse, onset of medical condition)
- Healthcare spending increases are highly persistent
 - Healthcare spending has annual autocorrelation of 0.901

Longevity risk by years of education



Isaac Sasson, 2016. "Trends in life expectancy and lifespan variation by educational attainment: United States, 1990-2010." *Demography*.

Managing cashflow mismatch

- Just buying SeLFIES for my age 65-85 years is not enough
- What is utility achievable if only SeLFIES that cover my age 65-105 years are available?
 - Protects against reasonable longevity risk
 - Coupon matches conservative spending stream early in retirement
 - Can sell before maturity to meet end-of-life expenses

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
How big is the demand for reverse mortgages in China?

Survey says...

- 89% of urban 45-69 year old homeowners are interested in reverse mortgage
- 84% of urban 20-49 year olds whose parents own at least one property would recommend reverse mortgage to their parents

Survey vs. representative urban homeowner sample

Highest education



Higher education associated with more interest

Table 3: Explaining the interest in reverse mortgages.

Survey	Survey 1 (Ages 45-69) Older homeowners		Survey 2 (Ages 20-49) Adult children	
Dependent variable	Interest		Recommend to parents	
Model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Demographics</i>				
Age	0.202 **	0.168 *	-0.271 **	-0.213 +
Female	0.315 *	0.394 **	-0.013	-0.003
Married	-0.052	-0.098	-0.284	-0.312
Tier 1	0.157	0.068	-0.108	-0.112
College or diploma	0.143	0.111	0.122	0.112
University degree	0.406 **	0.445 **	0.319	0.407 +
Private sector	0.076	0.063	0.209 +	0.189
Retired	-0.733 ***	-0.892 ***	-1.056	-0.726

The big question

Stated interest $\overset{?}{\rightarrow}$ Actual demand

U.S. reverse mortgage uptake




Figure 1. Percentage of older homeowners with reverse mortgages. This figure shows the proportion of all homeowners aged 65 and above that have RMLs. The data are constructed using various years of the AHS.

A calibration

?

U.S. stated interest \rightarrow Actual demand

Conclusion



There is cause to be concerned that there is a savings problem



Defaults can help the left tail, but aren't a panacea



20-year SeLFIES have more cashflow mismatch than desirable, but maybe 40-year SeLFIES would solve the problem



How does stated interest in survey translate to actual uptake?